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THE CALIFORNIA GRAND JUROR'S OATH:
A RELIGIOUS TEST?
INTRODUCTION
Under present interpretation the Federal Constitution prevents
both the federal government and the states from imposing religious
tests as conditions on holding public office.' This prohibition in-
cludes oaths of office which incorporate a declaration of belief in
God.' The California Constitution also proscribes such religious
qualifications by prescribing an exclusive form for oaths of public
office.8 Although grand jurors are not clearly within the accepted
definition of "public officer," 4 they are classified as "officers of the
court"5 and "holders of a public trust."' If, as the United States
Supreme Court held in Torcaso v. Watkins,7 a notary public cannot
be compelled to declare his belief in God as a condition of holding
office, then the grand juror should not be subjected to a religious
test since his responsibility to the public and to the persons with
whom he deals is far greater.8 Thus, at least the grand juror seems
to fall within the strictures of Torcaso.
California has attempted to obviate the religious oath problem
both constitutionally and statutorally. Besides the non-theistic form
of oath provided in the state constitution,9 the codes provide for
petit jury oaths which make no reference to a deity."° Witnesses
1 U.S. CONST. art. VI; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
2 The lower court in the Torcaso case observed that the oath in question included
the statement "I, Roger R. Torcaso, do declare that I believe in the existence of
God." Torcaso v. Watkins, 223 Md. 49, -, 162 A.2d 438, 440 (1960).
8 CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 3. Construing this section the California Supreme Court
stated: "[lIt would seem clear that any oath or declaration which imposes a religious
or political test is prohibited." Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal. 2d 676, 682, 249 P.2d
267, 271 (1952) (dictum).
4 "So far as definition has been attempted, a public office is said to be the right,
authority, and duty, created and conferred by law-the tenure of which is not tran-
sient, occasional, or incidental-by which for a given period an individual is invested
with power to perform a public function for public benefit. The individual who
occupies such an office is a 'public officer.'" People v. Rapsey, 16 Cal. 2d 636, 640,
107 P.2d 388, 390 (1940).
5 The grand jury is "an independent judicial body, the members of which
are officers of the court." In re Peart, 5 Cal. App. 2d 469, 473, 43 P.2d 334, 336 (1935).
0 Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, -, 213 A.2d 475, 478 (1965).
7 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
8 Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, -, 213 A.2d 475, 479 (1965).
9 CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 3. The oath appears to be exclusive: "And no other
oath, declaration, or test, shall be required as a qualification for any public office or
employment." Id.
10 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 604 (West 1955). This same form of oath is used in
criminal trials. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1046 (West 1955).
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may take a variety of religious oaths or, alternatively, an affirmation
or declaration." Within this system of alternative oaths for judicial
proceedings there remains an anomaly: the grand juror's oath sup-
plied in Penal Code section 911 explicitly requires the speaker to
swear by God. 2
The theistic grand jury oath, then, gives rise to two problems.
First, may a person be excluded from the grand jury panel for re-
fusal to take a theistic oath? Second, is a criminal defendant preju,-
diced when indicted by a grand jury composed solely of theists?
In attempting an answer to these questions, this comment will first
examine federal and then state constitutional objections to the
theistic grand jury oath as presently required in California by Penal
Code section 911.
THE OATH AS A RELIGIOUS TEST
In primitive belief the oath was regarded as an instrument of
magic, a conditional self-curse by which the speaker invoked super-
natural destruction on himself if the condition occurred.3 But in
contemporary thought the oath's power is subjective. "It must in-
volve the calling to mind of some superhuman moral retribution
which according to the witness' belief is calculated to induce him
to refrain from false statements and thus to avoid the retribution."' 4
In the modern oath the invocation, "so help me God," is a legal
device which effectively deters false-swearing only insofar as there
exists a supernaturally imposed sanction. 5 But in present-day law
the existence of such a sanction is purely subjective-it requires the
speaker's belief. Thus, to require a theistic oath is to require theistic
belief. To condition jury service on the taking of a theistic oath is
to impose a religious test.
In Torcaso v. Watkins" the Supreme Court held that a state
could not exact, as a condition of holding office, that a notary public
declare his belief in God as part of his oath of office." Although the
11 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 2094-97 (West 1955).
12 CAL. PENAL CODE § 911 (West Supp. 1967).
'3 Silving, The Oath: 1, 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1371 (1959).
14 6 WlGMOma, EVIDENCE § 1816 (3d ed. 1940) (emphasis added).
15 The religious oath has been criticized as illogical: "the turn of thought from
the objective to the subjective level amounts to the fact that while the state itself
has ceased to countenance the magic operation of the oath and is fully aware of its
illogical nature, it, nevertheless, utilizes the fallacious belief of its citizens as a medium
of legal control;" Silving, The Oath: 1, 68 YALE L.J. 1329, 1371 (1959) ; and in-
effective: "it may be questioned whether the oath exerts any deterrent effect on false
swearing beyond that exerted by the fear of prosecution for perjury." 74 Hv. I,,
Rv. 611, 612 (1961).
16 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
17 See note 2 supra.
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state requirement struck down in Torcaso was an express declara-
tion of belief in God,18 the Supreme Court's prohibition should be
equally applicable to the "so help me God" form of oath. Both
declarations have the same force and effect-the speaker must be-
lieve in the existence of an avenging God."
Reversed in Torcaso, the Maryland Supreme Court has devel-
oped a body of case law2° applying the Torcaso rule where the
competence of grand and petit jurors was conditioned on declaration
of belief in God. In the precedent-setting case of Schowgurow v.
State,2 the Maryland court held unconstitutional article 36 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights, which rendered jurors incompetent
for failure to declare a belief in God.22 Although both Torcaso and
Schowgurow involved requirements of an express declaration of
belief, it seems that it is not the form of expression which renders
such provisions unconstitutional, rather it is the requirement of be-
lief which violates the first amendment. This conclusion necessarily
follows because, to be efficacious, an oath sworn by God demands
belief in God. Requiring religious belief in the form of a theistic
oath rather than an express affirmation should not render the former
constitutional. A theistic oath, then, is a religious test within the
meaning of Torcaso.
FIRST AMENDMENT OBJECTIONS: THE EXCLUDED JUROR
As a matter of federal policy the test oath is abhorrent to the
American tradition.2" Article VI, clause 3 of the Constitution, by
banning religious tests for offices and public trusts held under the
United States, supports this policy.24 Although the religious test-ban
18 "That no religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any
office of profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence
of God." MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTs art. 37.
19 Because belief was pre-requisite the atheist was incompetent as a witness at
common law. Torcaso v. Watkins, 223 Md. 49, -, 162 A.2d 438, 443 (1960). This
rationale is made express in the Maryland Constitution: "[Nior shall any person,
otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent as a witness .. .provided he believes
in the existence of God, and that under His dispensation such person will be held
morally accountable for his act, and be rewarded or punished therefor either in the
world or in the world to come." MD. DECLARATION OF RIGIITS art. 36.
20 See, e.g., Schiller v. Lefkowitz, 242 Md. 461, 219 A.2d 378 (1966); State v.
Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965); Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121,
213 A.2d 475 (1965).
21 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).
22 "[N]or shall any person, otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent as a
witness, or juror, on account of his religious belief; provided, he believes in the
existence of God." MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTs art. 36.
28 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1945).
24 The colonists, themselves refugees from religious persecution, imposed religious
tests on denominations differing from their own beliefs. This situation induced the
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set forth in article VI does not apply to the states, it does portend
the scope of the first amendment's protection,25 applied to the states
as a principle of due process." The broad coverage of the first
amendment was reaffirmed in Torcaso:
[N]either a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally
force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion." Neither
can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all
religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions
based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions
founded on different beliefs. 27
Requiring the notary public to declare his belief in the existence of
God as a condition to taking office was an invasion of his "freedom
of belief and religion"2 and could not be enforced against him.29
If the requirement imposed upon the notary infringed his first
amendment freedoms, as derived through the fourteenth amendment,
the theistic oath imposed on the prospective grand juror has no less
an effect."° First, the requirement of a theistic oath could exert both
social and psychological pressure on conscientious non-theists, sum-
moned on venire, to adopt accepted theistic beliefs. 3 The Maryland
Supreme Court attempted to excuse this effect on the ground that a
person is not compelled to believe if office-holding is conditioned on
a declaration of theistic belief, since that person is not compelled
to seek public office.3 2 However the Supreme Court rejected this
argument. 3 As one commentator noted, "there are few, if any, privi-
leges or rights which citizens are forced to seek and enjoy,"3 4 in-
cluding the privilege of holding office. When government privileges
are distributed the classification used in distribution must be based
on reasonable distinctions; otherwise the parties against whom the
distinction operates are denied equal protection of the laws."5
drafting of Article VI, clause 3 of the Constitution. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488, 491 (1961).
25 See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1961).
26 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
27 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). Accord, Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Justice Black's reliance on Everson in deciding Torcaso
suggests that Torcaso was based on the "establishment of religion" clause. See The
Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40, 143-44 (1961).
28 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961).
29 There are several popular religions considered non-theistic, for example, Bud-
dhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular Humanism. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961).
30 Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, -, 213 A.2d 475, 479 (1965).
31 See The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. RFv. 40, 143-44 (1961).
32 Torcaso v. Watkins, 223 Md. 49, -, 162 A.2d 438, 442 (1960).
33 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
34 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 513, 518-19 (1961).
35 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Wieman was cited for this gen-
eral rule in Torcaso. 367 U.S. at 496.
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Second, the efficacy of the religious oath in barring the un-
scrupulous from service is questionable. Because the effectiveness
of the theistic oath depends on a subjective belief, honest non-
believers are perfunctorily excluded while dishonest non-believers
misrepresent their convictions and are impanelled. 6 This method
seems to penalize honesty and reward false-swearing, an effect
directly contrary to the obvious purposes of the oath.
Third, the historical experience which supports the Torcaso
rationale seems equally relevant in the jury oath situation. Because
the early settlers of the colonies, having themselves fled religious
persecution, proceeded to enact their own discriminatory laws,87 the
framers of the Constitution included in article VI the provision that
"no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office or public Trust under the United States." But dissatisfied
with the guarantees contained in the original document, such as
article VI, clause 3, the very people against whom those guarantees
were directed brought pressure to bear on the states and the Bill
of Rights was adopted, broadening the protection given religion.
Torcaso brought the notary within this protection.
The strong constitutional policy announced by Torcaso mili-
tates against the legitimacy of Penal Code section 911.88 Insofar as
it precludes a grand juror from service for refusing to take a theistic
oath, Penal Code section 911 is a violation of the juror's "freedom
of belief and religion."
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OBJECTIONS:
THE PREJUDICED DEFENDANT
Although religious discrimination against grand jurors clearly
threatens rights contained in the first amendment, applied to the
states as a matter of due process, prejudice to a defendant indicted
by a grand jury impanelled under an unconstitutional regulation
results from deprival of rights contained in the fourteenth amend-
ment. In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. the Supreme Court held as a
matter of policy that:
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with
either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an im-
partial jury8 9 drawn from a cross-section40 of the community.... This
86 "[MJen's consciences grow so large that the respect of their private advantage
rather induces men . . . to perjury." Slade's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074, 1078 (K.B.
1602). See 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 513, 519 (1961).
87 See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 491 (1961).
88 CAL. PENAL CODE § 911 (West Supp. 1967).
89 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
40 "[Cross-section] means a fair sample; and a sample drawn at random from
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does not mean, of course, that every jury must contain representatives
of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical
groups of the community.... But it does mean that prospective jurors
shall be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional
exclusion of any of these groups .... Jury competence is an individual
rather than a group or class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of
the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions
and discriminations which are abhorrent to the democratic ideals of
trial by jury.41
This broad principle clearly applies to grand jury selection as well.42
Within this principle a plethora of cases has arisen most of which
find racial exclusion prejudicial to the defendant as a denial of equal
protection.43
Moreover, in a long line of cases,44 the Maryland Supreme
Court has held that a defendant is deprived of equal protection
when indicted by a grand jury which was selected under a state
constitutional provision that conditioned competence on making a
declaration of belief in God. Adhering to the prohibition against
religious tests for public office announced in Torcaso v. Watkins45
the Maryland court decided that the first amendment protected the
grand juror as well as the notary public since the grand juror's duties
and responsibilities are far greater. 46 Because the grand jury was,
therefore, unconstitutionally composed solely of theists, the non-
theistic defendant was denied equal protection by analogy to the
racial exclusion cases.
The Exclusion Problem
In the racial exclusion cases47 defendants were denied equal
protection where members of their race were systematically or inten-
the whole community will of course represent the distribution of wealth in the
community as a whole, as it would represent the distribution of age, height, pre-
disposition to sclerosis, or any other characteristic; but nobody contends that the list
must be a sample of the whole community." United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201,
224 (2d Cir. 1950).
41 Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). The case was decided
by the Court in its capacity as administrator of the federal court system. Thus the
Court did not reach the issue of whether article VI of the Constitution applied also
to the states.
42 Accord, Chance v. United States, 322 F.2d 201 (1963).
43 See Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958) ; Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85
(1955); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (Mexican-Americans excluded).
44 See, e.g., Schiller v. Lefkowitz, 242 Md. 461, 219 A.2d 378 (1966) (defendant
in civil action entitled to constitutionally selected jury); State v. Madison, 240 Md.
265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965) (defendant not a member of excluded class); Schowgurow
v. State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).
45 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
46 Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, -, 213 A.2d 475, 479 (1965).
47 Cases cited note 43 supra.
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tionally excluded from the grand or petit jury because of their race.
Under the general principle enunciated in Thiel v. Southern Pacific
Co.48 exclusion on religious grounds is equally abhorrent to Amer-
ican tradition. However, in the racial discrimination cases defendant
adduced evidence of actual exclusion of members of his race from
the juries involved,49 whereas there was no evidence of actual exclu-
sion in Schowgurow v. State.50 The Maryland Supreme Court dis-
tinguished the case on the ground that, while the racial exclusion
cases contained an actual showing of discrimination, the statutes
involved were ostensibly non-discriminatory whereas in Schowgurow
the state constitution was discriminatory on its face.51 Since compli-
ance with this unconstitutional jury qualification must be presumed,
a showing of actual exclusion was unnecessary.52 It is settled that a
statute which on its face excludes persons from the grand jury on
the ground of race violates the fourteenth amendment. 3 In view of
the Thiel principle, exclusion on the basis of religion is also uncon-
stitutional.
Since Penal Code section 911 imposes a theistic grand jury
oath which constitutes a religious test within the meaning of Torcaso
v. Watkins, it seems discriminatory on its face. The non-theist in-
dicted by a grand jury sworn under section 911 is denied equal
protection of the laws in the same manner as the Negro defendant
indicted by a grand jury from which members of his race have been
excluded.54
48 328 U.S. 217 (1946) supra.
49 For example, in Eubanks one-third of the parish of trial were Negroes; a
substantial number of these were qualified to serve on the grand jury; the jury
commission had regularly picked Negroes for jury service since 1936; but only one
Negro had served within memory, apparently because he was mistaken for a white
man. Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958).
50 This was a point of dissent, 240 Md. at -, 213 A.2d at 485.
51 See note 22 supra.
52 "When the system of jury selection on its face shows discrimination and
exclusion, an actual showing of discrimination on the basis of comparative numbers
of the excluded and non-excluded classes on the jury lists is unnecessary." 240 Md.
at -, 213 A.2d at 482.
53 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). "Nor if a law should be
passed excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen, would there be any doubt of its
inconsistency with the [fourteenth] amendment." Id. at 308.
54 The Maryland Court has also ruled that a defendant could successfully quash
the indictment even if he is not a member of the class excluded from the grand jury.
Because the state constitution is discriminatory on its face, no individual prejudice
need be shown. Where the method of trial is unconstitutional defendant cannot be
tried without depriving him of due process. Moreover, to permit the non-theist to
quash the indictment but deny it to the theist would be discriminating on the ground
of religion-a classic example of denial of equal protection. State v. Madison, 240
Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965).
Although the Supreme Court has held that petitioner need not show that he
was individually prejudiced, nor that he was one of the excluded class, in that case
the court acted in the exercise of its power of supervision over the administration
[Vol..8
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CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY POLICY
Article XX, section 3 of the California Constitution provides
an exclusive form of oath for all public officers and employees, in-
cluding those judicial, and provides that "no other oath, declaration,
or test, shall be required as a qualification for any public office or
employment." Motivation for this provision was the infamous Stat-
ute of Charles III' which imposed loyalty oaths and religious tests: 5"
Moreover the state constitutional framers were probably influenced
by the ban on religious tests contained in article VI, clause 3 of the
Federal Constitution.57 While the language of a particular oath is
not limited to the words of article XX, the form of words must not
go beyond the intent, object and meaning of the State constitution.5 8
Nevertheless, in view of the history of article XX, it seems that
"any oath or declaration which imposes a religious or political test
is prohibited."59
Although the grand juror has been termed an "officer of the
court"'0 and "holder of a public trust," 1 it is uncertain that he
would be a "public officer"62 within the scope of article XX" While
article XX, clause 3 may not directly control the constitutionality
of the grand juror's oath found in Penal Code section 911, neverthe-
less California constitutional policy militates against religious test-
oaths .
California statutes provide a comprehensive system of alterna-
tive oaths for participants in judicial proceedings. Section 604 of
the Code of Civil Procedure contains a simple form of jury oath for
civil jurors which makes no reference to a deity.65 This form is
administered to criminal jurors under Penal Code section 1046.66
of justice in federal courts and, hence, the decision does not control the fourteenth
amendment issue. Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
55 25 Car. II, c. 2 (1673).
56 See Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal. 2d 676, 682, 249 P.2d 267, 271 (1952).
57 Id. at 691, 249 P.2d at 276 (dissent).
58 Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293, 310 (1863); accord, Pockman v. Leonard, 39
Cal. 2d 676, 249 P.2d 267 (1952).
69 Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal. 2d 676, 682, 249 P.2d 267, 271 (1952) (dictum).
60 See note 5 supra.
61 Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, -, 213 A.2d 475, 478 (1965).
62 CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 3; under the Constitution of 1879 the article included
"holders of the public trust" as well as "public officers." But that phrase was deleted
in 1952 and replaced with "[public] employment."
63 "The terms 'office' and 'public trust' have been said to be nearly synonymous
.. . but the particular positions to which they apply have not been clearly de-
fined . . . . [T]he meaning and extent of the term 'office' tends to vary with the
purpose of the statute in which it appears." Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal. 2d 676,
683, 249 P.2d 267, 272 (1952).
64 Id. at 682, 249 P.2d at 271 (dictum).
65 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 604 (West 1955).
66 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1046 (West 1955).
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Code of Civil Procedure, sections 2094 through 2097 provide a
number of non-theistic oaths and alternate affirmations for wit-
nesses.6 7 Although section 2097 states that "Any person who prefers
it may declare or affirm," that section is titled "Oath to witness"
and it also incorporates the form of section 2094, the usual witness'
oath. 8 Moreover Penal Code section 911, the grand juror's oath,
is exclusive."
Despite the fact that the grand juror's oath of Penal Code sec-
tion 911 is exclusive there does not appear to be any policy which
would militate against the adoption of alternate forms. In fact, the
comprehensive system of alternatives for petit jurors and witnesses
indicates a liberal legislative policy with regard to alternate forms
of oath. By requiring an exclusive oath section 911 is an anomaly
in this system and should be changed.
CONCLUSION
The familiar oath of the modern courtroom is derived from
pre-religious rituals of primitive cultures. As a self-curse, dependant
on magical power, the oath did not survive the rise of Western
monotheism, but instead its magical power was replaced with the
retributive power of the God of monotheistic religions.7 0 In its sub-
jective form, dependent on the individual's belief, the religious oath
is not only illogical71 but can be conducive of perjury rather than
honesty.7 s
Since it requires the belief of the speaker the theistic oath is
in reality a religious test and is therefore abhorrent to federal con-
stitutional principles. In particular, the California grand jury oath
may prejudice the rights of at least two parties. If the public official
is denied freedom of belief and religion when required to make a
declaration of belief as part of his oath of office,7 the grand juror
is also deprived of his rights when required to give a religious oath
contrary to his belief. 4 If the criminal defendant is denied equal
protection of the law when indicted by a grand jury from which
67 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 2094-97 (West 1955).
68 "You do solemnly swear (or affirm as the case may be), that the evidence
you shall give in this issue . . . shall be the truth .... " CAL. CODE Civ. PaOC.
§ 2094 (West 1955).
69 "The following oath shall be taken by each member of the grand jury." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 911 (West Supp. 1967).
70 See generally Silving, The Oath: 1, 68 YALE L.J. 1329 (1959).
71 Id. at 1371.
72 See note 36 supra.
78 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
74 Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).
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members of his race have been excluded,7 5 he is also denied equal
protection when the grand jury is chosen solely from theists by force
of a religious oath.76
Not only does California constitutional policy militate against
the imposition of religious oaths," but the statutes also reveal a
legislative intent to provide alternatives to the religious oath. 8
Already an anachronism, the religious oath found in Penal Code
section 911 is an anomaly in California's system of oaths for judicial
proceedings and should be changed.
Edward B. Lozowicki
75 See, e.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958).
76 Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).
77 Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal. 2d 676, 682, 249 P.2d 267, 271 (1952) (dictum).
78 See statutes cited notes 65-67 supra.
